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In a previously published article, I reported some tests of prospect theory’s reflection 
effect over outcomes defined by money and life years gained from treatment. Those 
results suggested qualified support for the reflection effect over money outcomes and 
strong support over longevity outcomes. This article reruns those tests while accounting 
for the intensity of individual risk attitudes, and, overall, show consistency with the 
reflection effect. However, I argue that these results do not necessarily offer support for 
the explanatory power of prospect theory. Rather, the results may be driven by evolved 
responses to circumstances that provoke perceptions of scarcity and abundance. 
Therefore, from an ecological perspective, behavioural patterns such as those that are 
consistent with the reflection effect, which, by extension, tend to be considered as 
erroneous or biased by most behavioural economists because they conflict with the 
postulates of rational choice theory, may not be unreasonable. Recognising as such is 
important when considering how behavioural insights ought to inform public policy 
design and implementation.      
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Prospect Theory’s Reflection Effect 
 
Nobody working in behavioural public policy will be unfamiliar with prospect theory, 
with its component parts of probability weighting and, particularly, loss aversion having 
occupied prominent places in the discourse during the development of this relatively new 
multidisciplinary field. However, in the behavioural public policy literature (and indeed, 
in behavioural economics generally), little attention has been paid to what is, according to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the most distinctive implication of their theory: 
specifically, the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes known as the reflection effect. Given 
prospect theory’s general standing, this relative oversight is remiss. The purpose of this 
article is to give the reflection effect some much needed exposure.  
 
The combination of an individual’s declining sensitivity to mounting gains and mounting 
losses and their subjective weighting of probability (such that they overweight low 
probabilities and underweight high probabilities), which is predicted by prospect theory, 
causes the reflection effect. The reflection effect is summarised in Table 1, which derives 
its name from the opposing risk attitude predictions between gain and loss-framed 
gambles when the probabilities of experiencing a gain/loss are high, and also when the 




Prospect Theory’s Reflection Effect 
    Gains    Losses 
High Probability  Risk Aversion   Risk Seeking 
Low Probability  Risk Seeking   Risk Aversion 
 
 
Typically, a utility curve is constructed by plotting a respondent’s certainty equivalent of 
a gamble against the expected value of that gamble, where the gamble takes the form of 
p.x + (1-p).0, with x fixed, and repeating across the probability range. If this were done 
for +x and -x, then we can construct a curve across the domains of both gains and losses. 
Figure 1 is a hypothetical depiction, where the black dotted line represents universal risk 
neutrality, the assumption that underpins standard rational choice theory. The red dotted 
curve is a representation that is consistent with the reflection effect: i.e. risk aversion over 
high probability gains and low probability losses, and risk seeking over low probability 
gains and high probability losses. 
 
Controlled direct testing of the full reflection effect has been scarce and the results have 
been mixed. In a previously published article, I attempted to test reflection over both 
money and health-related outcomes – see Oliver (2018), in which much of the literature 
on reflection is reviewed. In those results, the evidence for the full reflection effect over 
money outcomes was also a little mixed, in that while the risk attitudes were strongly 
consistent with reflection when respondents were faced with high probability gambles, 
there was no general strong support for prospect theory reflection over small probability 
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gambles. However, the results provided strong support for the full reflection effect over 
outcomes defined by longevity.   
 
 
Figure 1:  




In my previous article, I tested only for the direction of each respondent’s risk attitude in 
any question that they answered. As such, the response of someone who was, for 
example, only very marginally risk averse when faced with a particular gamble was given 
the same weight in testing the reflection effect as that given by a respondent who was 
highly risk seeking when presented with the same gamble. However, that the intensity of 
individual risk attitudes ought to count in tests of this kind cannot be dismissed lightly. 
Therefore, in part to further emphasise what the reflection effect predicts and in part to 
serve as some tests of robustness, I will hereby re-examine those results after taking into 
account the intensities of the respondents’ risk attitudes. 
 
 
Reflecting on Money 
 
The sample size was small and chosen for convenience – i.e. 60 postgraduate and 
university staff, 45 of whom were female (44 were age 18-30 years, 13 were 31-45 years, 
one was 46-60 years and two were older than 60 years, and 44 had studied economics) – 
but no claim is made that the results are definitive. They are merely illustrative. Each 
respondent attended a face-to-face interview during which they were required to answer 
Concavity implies risk aversion 
Convexity implies risk seeking 
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30 questions. The questions were described as investment decisions, and their order was 
randomised across the respondents in a within-respondent design. To illustrate, two of the 




The Questions Using Money Outcomes 
Question 1: You inherited an investment and there is a 90% chance that you could gain 
£10,000, with a 10% chance of gaining or losing nothing. You can, if you wish, sell this 
investment. What is the minimum amount of money for which you would be prepared to 
sell the investment? 
 
Question 2: You inherited an investment and there is a 90% chance that you could lose 
£10,000, with a 10% chance of losing or gaining nothing. You can cancel this investment, 
but you will have to pay a penalty in order to do so. What is the maximum amount of 
money that you would be prepared to pay to cancel the investment?  
 
 
The respondents’ near certainty equivalents were elicited for risky investment decisions 
that offered 90%, 70%, 50%, 30% and 10% chances of gaining and losing £1million, 
£10,000 and £100. The respondents knew that the questions were financially incentivised 
from the outset, but they were told that their payments would have to be scaled down 
from those indicated in the questions – the payments were normalised so that a maximum 
of £1 could be earned from each question, but the respondents were informed of the exact 
scaling only after they had answered the questions. 
 
In a manner that mirrors that described for Figure 1, Figure 3 plots the respondents’ 
median and mean certainty equivalents against the expected values of the gambles for 
each of the outcome magnitudes (i.e. £1million, £10,000 and £100). The black dotted 
lines imply universal risk neutrality, and the red and blue dotted curves respectively plot 
the respondents’ median and mean certainty equivalents.    
 
Particularly with respect to the means, the Figure shows that the respondents were 
generally less accepting of risk for all three outcome magnitudes as probabilities declined 
in the domain of losses and as probabilities increased in the domain of gains, an 
observation that is consistent with prospect theory’s reflection effect. Risk attitudes were 
more pronounced at the mean than at the median level, but for both measures risk 
neutrality was typically observed for low probability losses. It is, however, possible that 
the reflection effect’s prediction of risk aversion in that area would have been more 
evident had percentage chances of losses lower than 10% been used in the tests. By far 
the strongest deviation from risk neutrality for all outcome magnitudes was risk seeking 
over high probability losses. 
 
However, the medians plotted in the Figure do not internalise the intensity of the risk 
attitudes. The means may better internalise intensity, which is perhaps why the mean 
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curves are relatively more pronounced, but they are susceptible to distortions by outliers. 
Non-parametric tests of whether risk attitudes, after accounting for their intensity, differ 








The intensity of each respondent’s risk attitude in each question was calculated with: 
 
(CE-EV)/EV          [1]  
 
where CE is the respondent’s certainty equivalent of a gamble and EV is the expected 
value of that gamble. If the individual is risk neutral, Equation [1] = 0. Risk averse and 
risk seeking attitudes therefore produce a risk attitude intensity measure either side of 
zero. Tests of the respondents’ attitudes towards risk were undertaken for all 30 
questions, with the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test used throughout. The results 
are summarised in Table 2.  
 
In the Table, the gambles that offered a chance of gaining £1million are summarised in 
the first five rows of the first column, and the respondents’ collective risk attitude, 
accounting for the risk attitude intensity demonstrated by each respondent, is placed next 
to each gamble. The gambles that offered a chance of losing £1million are summarised in 
the first five rows of the third column and the accompanying collective risk attitude is 
placed next to each of those. Similar presentations of the gambles that included outcome 
magnitudes of £10,000 and £100 are given in the middle and bottom thirds of the Table, 
respectively.  
 
On the whole, after taking into account the respondents’ risk attitude intensities, the 
results in Table 2 are broadly consistent with those depicted in Figure 3. That is, for all 
three outcome magnitudes, the respondents generally became more averse to risk as 
probability increased in the domain of gains and as probability declined in the domain of 
losses, which, as noted earlier, is consistent with the predictions of the prospect theory 
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reflection effect. The lowest probability gambles, in the domains of both gains and losses, 
sometimes reach only a point of risk neutrality in these tests when, at face value, one 
might expect risk seeking over gains and risk aversion over losses, but, again, this may 
because the lowest probabilities used in these tests were not always sufficiently low 
enough for the respondents to depart significantly and systematically from the position of 
being risk neutral. As observed in Figure 3, the most intense and consistent risk attitude 
was that of risk seeking in the face of high – and not always high – probability losses, an 




Results After Accounting for Intensity of Risk Attitude Over Money Outcomes 
Investment  Risk direction   Investment  Risk direction 
(£1million, 0.1) Neutral   (-£1million, 0.1) Neutral  
(£1million, 0.3) Neutral   (-£1million, 0.3)* Seeking 
(£1million, 0.5) Neutral   (-£1million, 0.5)* Seeking 
(£1million, 0.7)* Aversion   (-£1million, 0.7)* Seeking 
(£1million, 0.9)* Aversion   (-£1million, 0.9)* Seeking 
(£10,000, 0.1)* Seeking   (-£10,000, 0.1) Neutral  
(£10,000, 0.3)*  Seeking   (-£10,000, 0.3) Neutral 
(£10,000, 0.5)  Neutral   (-£10,000, 0.5)* Seeking 
(£10,000, 0.7)** Aversion   (-£10,000, 0.7)* Seeking 
(£10,000, 0.9)* Aversion   (-£10,000, 0.9)* Seeking 
(£100, 0.1)*  Seeking   (-£100, 0.1)*  Aversion  
(£100, 0.3)*  Seeking   (-£100, 0.3)**  Seeking 
(£100, 0.5)*  Seeking   (-£100, 0.5)*  Seeking 
(£100, 0.7)  Neutral   (-£100, 0.7)*  Seeking 
(£100, 0.9)**  Aversion   (-£100, 0.9)*  Seeking 
* 1% significance 
** 5% significance       
 
 
My previously published article was I think the first to report tests of fourfold reflection 
over health-related longevity, with the full effect holding up very well in those. However, 
we (or rather, I) ought to examine whether those conclusions persist after also accounting 
for the intensity of the respondents’ risk attitudes.    
 
 
Reflecting on Health 
 
A similar, but different, sample of respondents answered the health-related questions – 
i.e. 60 postgraduates and university staff, 45 of whom were female (47 were age 18-30 
years and 13 were 31-45 years, and 44 had studied economics). Each respondent attended 
a face-to-face interview during which they answered 30 hypothetical health care-related 
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questions. The order of the questions was randomised across the respondents in a within-




The Questions Using Longevity Outcomes 
Question 1: You have an illness which will kill you within the next few days unless you 
take a treatment. Two treatments are available to you. If you take treatment A, there is a 
90% chance that you will live for 36 more months and then die, and a 10% chance that 
the treatment will not work and you will die within the next few days. Alternatively, 
treatment B offers a number of months of life for certain, but we do not know how many 
months that is.  
What is the minimum number of months you would require from treatment B in order for 
you to just prefer to take B over A?  
 
Question 2: You are someone who would normally expect 36 more months of life. 
Unfortunately, your situation is not normal, and you need to take a health care treatment. 
Without treatment, you are certain to lose all 36 months. With treatment A, you still face 
a 90% chance of losing the 36 months, but have a 10% chance of maintaining your 
normal life expectancy. Your doctor has offered you alternative treatment B where you 
are certain to lose a number of months from your normal life expectancy.  
How many months of your normal life expectancy are you willing to forgo in order to be 
tempted to take B over A?  
 
 
The respondents near certainty equivalents were elicited for risky health care treatments 
offering 90%, 70%, 50%, 30% and 10% chances of gains and losses of 480 months, 180 
months and 36 months of life. The respondents were paid a flat fee of £10 for their 
participation, and were asked to assume that additional longevity would be experienced in 
full health. Months rather than years of life were chosen in the hope that this would cause 
the respondents to fine-tune their answers. Figure 5 plots the respondents’ median and 
mean certainty equivalents against the expected values of the health care treatments for 
each of the outcome magnitudes.  
 
If one focusses upon the medians, the Figure suggests that the respondents did not stray 
too far from risk neutrality, except when faced with high probability losses. The means, 
as with the study that used money outcomes, offer a more pronounced impression of a set 
of risk attitudes that are evidently consistent with the predictions of the prospect theory 
reflection effect. As was also the case with the tests using money outcomes, if one 
considers the medians and means together, the standout departure from risk neutrality is 











Table 3 summarises the results of the tests of the reflection effect over longevity 
outcomes after accounting for the intensity of the respondents’ risk attitudes. In all cases 
where attitudes depart from risk neutrality they do so at a high level of statistical 
significance, and the risk attitude patterns as probability increases is consistent with the 
predictions of the prospect theory reflection effect in the domain of both gains (i.e. risk 
seeking to risk aversion) and losses (i.e. risk aversion to risk seeking) across all three 
outcome magnitudes. Therefore, at face value, these tests over longevity offer strong 




Results After Accounting for Intensity of Risk Attitude Over Longevity Outcomes 
Treatment  Risk direction   Treatment  Risk direction 
(480 months, 0.1)* Seeking   (-480 months, 0.1)* Aversion  
(480 months, 0.3) Neutral   (-480 months, 0.3) Neutral 
(480 months, 0.5)* Aversion   (-480 months, 0.5) Neutral 
(480 months, 0.7)* Aversion   (-480 months, 0.7)* Seeking 
(480 months, 0.9)* Aversion   (-480 months, 0.9)* Seeking 
(180 months, 0.1)* Seeking   (-180 months, 0.1)* Aversion  
(180 months, 0.3)*  Seeking   (-180 months, 0.3)* Aversion 
(180 months, 0.5)* Aversion   (-180 months, 0.5) Neutral 
(180 months, 0.7)* Aversion   (-180 months, 0.7)* Seeking 
(180 months, 0.9)* Aversion   (-180 months, 0.9)* Seeking 
(36 months, 0.1)* Seeking   (-36 months, 0.1)* Aversion  
(36 months, 0.3)* Seeking   (-36 months, 0.3)* Aversion 
(36 months, 0.5) Neutral   (-36 months, 0.5) Neutral 
(36 months, 0.7)* Aversion   (-36 months, 0.7)* Seeking 
(36 months, 0.9)* Aversion   (-36 months, 0.9)* Seeking 






Placing to one side the many methodological objections that people may have to my 
experiments (I apologise that I could not actually offer people the chance to win or lose 
£1 million, and that I could not place people in life limiting conditions, and those who are 
unconvinced by any study that is not fully incentivised are free, or course, to ignore this 
article), the results presented above are generally consistent with the predictions of 
prospect theory. However, although the predictive validity of prospect theory with respect 
to these particular results is quite high, its performance as an explanatory theory depends 
on whether people really do assess risky options by somewhat mechanistically weighting 
the subjective value of their outcomes with the associated subjective probabilities. Might 
it instead be the case that people’s responses in these tests were influenced heavily by 
deeply ingrained survival instincts that evolved in relation to perceptions of whether 
available (food) resources are scarce or abundant? 
 
The hypothesis of risk aversion in the face of abundance and risk seeking in the face of 
extreme scarcity to facilitate survival is postulated by risk sensitivity theory, developed 
by behavioural ecologists to explain rational food acquisition decision-making by 
foraging animals in an uncertain environment. Mishra (2014), for example, notes that risk 
aversion will switch to risk seeking when a nutritional need has to be fulfilled and which 
cannot be met with a low risk option; thus, rather than outcomes maximization over 
repeated tasks, the evolved emphasis –  which may still today be rational in many 
circumstances – is on attempting to meet one’s basic needs in the moment.  
 
If probability serves as a proxy for prior (and thus expected) frequency of success in the 
respondents’ psychologies as they process the risky decisions that they face, then the top 
and bottom left quadrants of Table 1 – respectively, high and low probabilities of a gain – 
may respectively provoke perceptions of abundance and scarcity; perceptions that are 
central to the explanatory power of risk sensitivity theory. With abundance, people may 
be quite satisfied with an implicitly risk averse strategy – accepting a guaranteed amount 
that is less than the expected value of the gamble suffices. However, with scarcity the 
expected value of a gamble that offers a small chance of a gain is insufficient to meet 
one’s needs or aspirations. It is only by accepting the gamble that one has any chance at 
all of seeing those needs or aspirations met. If people implicitly also perceive the bottom 
and top right quadrants of Table 1 – respectively, high and low probabilities of a loss – as 
situations that suggest scarcity and abundance (i.e. if a loss is interpreted as a failure to 
meet one’s needs or aspirations), risk sensitivity theory offers an explanation for the 
patterns of risk attitude that are consistent with the full reflection effect. 
 
It may be the case that the size of the outcome rather than the probability of success is 
sometimes the dominant factor in influencing perceptions of scarcity and abundance. For 
example, if there is a good chance of experiencing what might be considered a very small 
gain, the perception might be one of scarcity rather than abundance, which may thus 
provoke actions and behaviours that are consistent with risk seeking rather than risk 
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aversion. Thus, it is possible that the consideration of either extremely small or extremely 
large outcomes might lead to ecologically rational choices that are inconsistent with the 
predictions of prospect theory. For instance, although the expected value of a large 
probability of a very small outcome might strike most people as neither here nor there, 
thus causing them to opt for the risk, the expected value of a small probability of an 
extremely large outcome may suffice for most people, implying risk aversion. These 
behavioural tendencies might invoke a different type of reflection effect than that 
predicted by prospect theory, and yet can still be explained by risk sensitivity theory.  
 
Relatedly, risk sensitivity theory can also explain Markowitz’s (1952) hypothesis 
pertaining to risk attitudes. Markowitz proposed that at, say, a 10% chance of winning or 
losing, people will be risk averse over gambles that offer large gains or small losses (e.g. 
respectively, preferring £10,000,000 for sure over a 10% chance of £100,000,000, and 
preferring losing £10p for sure over a 10% chance of losing £1), and risk seeking over 
gambles that offer small gains and large losses (e.g. respectively, preferring a 10% 
chance of £1 over 10p for sure, and preferring a 10% chance of losing £100,000,000 over 
losing £10,000,000 for sure). Gambles that present particularly large gains or small losses 
might be interpreted as scenarios of abundance, while those that present particularly small 
gains and large losses are perhaps more likely to be perceived as scenarios of scarcity 
(depending on where one’s reference point lies). Risk sensitivity theory thus suggests that 
if one takes a broad ecological perspective, seemingly inconsistent predictions made in 
the behavioural economics literature, such as those offered by the Markowitz and 
prospect theory hypotheses, may be explained under a single framework.  
 
The results presented in this article in support of the prospect theory reflection effect may 
therefore be an artifact of the experiment’s design (e.g. the size of the probabilities and 
outcomes used), and might not actually be explained by prospect theory. A more general 
ecological explanation encompasses both these and other results. If the reflection effect, 
and indeed the whole gamut of predictions that are made within the field of behavioural 
economics, are usefully to extend their increasing and already substantial input into 
public policy design, it would make sense to try to reinforce those predictions with 
genuine explanatory depth.  
 
For instance, a risk seeking tendency, predicted by prospect theory and often observed in 
human decision-making, has been attributed to errors and biases in human decision-
making, and these tendencies can certainly be manipulated to impose harms upon people, 
as the gambling industry – and, in particular, the rise of online gambling – attests. But if 
one tries to understand how a person’s circumstances and environment motivates him or 
her to behave, act and decide in particular ways, one might appreciate that their 
inconsistencies with standard notions of rational choice are not necessarily irrational in a 
more inclusive sense of the term. A policy maker might then realise that some people 
might rationally choose to gamble, for example, because they believe that this is the only 
possible way for them to escape a particular financial predicament. If their situation is 
already dire in the absence of gambling, then attempting to regulate their gambling 




To sum up, behavioural economists and relevant psychologists have over the past several 
decades done a good job at identifying systematic behavioural patterns, but their attempts 
at explaining their findings have generally been a little perfunctory. As a discipline, they 
(or rather, we) need to escape from the overriding belief that all that conflicts with 
rational choice theory is erroneous and biased, or, in other words, that the maximisation 
of utility (or welfare or happiness) is necessarily the appropriate normative standard to 
pursue. The findings uncovered by behavioural economists may be perfectly reasonable 
responses given the circumstances and the environment that people find themselves in, 
and recognising as such ought to influence how these findings should be used, or not 
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